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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Roman Stoicism : Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with Special Reference to its Development within the Roman Empire. By E. VERNON ARNOLD. Cambridge University Press, 1911. Pp. xi + 468.

The book under review falls naturally into three parts. Chapters I.-III. ('The World-Religions'; 'Heraclitus and Socrates'; 'The Academy and the Porch') aim to present the antecedents of Stoicism and the known details of its founder's life and development; chapters IV.-XV., constituting the main body of the work, set forth the Stoic doctrine; the two remaining chapters, entitled 'Stoicism in Roman History and Literature' and 'The Stoic Strain in Christianity', deal with the influence of the Porch. From this summary view, as from the title of his work, it is clear that our author is chiefly concerned to present a faithful account of Stoicism and its doctrines; what precedes and follows is of secondary importance. This the reviewer is bound to take into consideration, and to judge the book accordingly. It may be said at once, therefore, that in the part which the author clearly regarded as of first importance his work is unusually excellent; it is only in the chapters which serve to frame his picture, that the critic discovers his coveted opportunity for fault-finding.

In his chapter on the world-religions Professor Arnold, who rightly conceives Stoicism as essentially a religion, passes in review Chaldaism, Persism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Druidism, and considers them in relation to the thought of the Porch, assuming in general the point of view of those who are most inclined to credit foreign, especially oriental, religions with a great influence on Greek thought. Though aware of the reluctance of leading historians to accept the views which he entertains, he advances them with apparent assurance. His procedure may be excused on the ground that all this is *ἐξω τοῦ μυθεύματος*; but it is to be regretted that he fails to make distinctions which would seem to be necessary in any historical account. First, there is the distinction of periods. One who readily accepts Persian or Chaldean influence in the time of the Roman Empire may be pardoned for incredulity touching the period extending from the seventh to the fifth centuries B. C. Again, one may incline to admit the probability of a general stimulus to religious enthusiasm without believing in the propagation of specific alien doctrines, especially if known indigenous antecedents fairly suffice to explain the facts. The statements of Greek and Roman authors on such matters are known

to afford an insecure basis for history, since their motives and the limitations of their knowledge are patent. The modern student is incomparably more competent to judge; for he not only has ready to his hand the results of ancient observation and the accumulated data of anthropological research, but he commands also a wider survey of history and an acquaintance in particular with the slow processes by which even the most energetic propaganda succeeds in changing the deep-seated convictions of alien peoples. We know that centuries of inner disintegration of the Hellenic bed-rock were required to prepare a soil suitable to the growth of Hellenistic syncretism. Even after this secular *praeparatio* the several oriental religions, though organized and pressing a zealous propaganda, failed in more than one instance to strike root in Greece. Such considerations as these, supported by a formidable array of facts brought to light by the researches of recent years in the field of Hellenistic religions, counsel conservatism respecting the venturesome guesses of certain partisans who flourished a generation ago. This is preëminently a matter in which the ark of science is in the keeping of the sceptics. The case is similar to that of the enthusiasm for literary reminiscences; for there is a real difference, though it may be difficult in individual instances to distinguish, between a phrase that suggested to the mind of an author an imitation or an allusion, and one that by whatever inscrutable links of association may serve to connect it with another in the mind of a reader. An old friend used to speak of such so-called reminiscences as 'literary illusions', and it behoves us similarly to guard against historical illusions.

The other two introductory chapters, which deal with the history of Greek thought, are open at many points to quite as serious objection. In looking over the pencilled pages I am struck with the number of statements which provoked a protest or a query. Some are indeed debatable questions, but even in regard to Plato and Aristotle, where one may speak with a larger measure of assurance, there are slips which would merit censure if they belonged to the central theme of the book. One might have expected better things even here from a pupil of Henry Jackson. The worst fault of these chapters is that they are superficial and perfunctory. The same charge cannot be leveled at the chapter (XVII.) on the Stoic strain in Christianity; for though the author is confessedly trenching on debatable ground, he writes with obvious interest and with first-hand knowledge. The chapter on Stoicism in Roman history and literature gives an instructive survey of the higher morality and serious thought under the Republic and the Empire. One feels, however, and the author is obviously himself aware, that the term 'Stoicism' is at times employed to cover what is in no way technically to be so regarded. Thus when the Stoicism of Vergil is discussed, much that was only the common heritage of Greek thought is ascribed to the influence of the Porch.

It is in fact difficult to define Stoicism. Professor Arnold ranges it among the religions, and claims for it only a slight degree of originality of thought. It were better to regard it as essentially a temper of soul—the strenuous, heroic temper, coupled with a robust will to think and act consistently and to subordinate all to the supreme ideal. At Rome it came to be the practical faith of many a true man who acknowledged no allegiance to the school; just as to-day in Christian lands the thought and conduct of men in no way allied to the Church conform to its central doctrines. Whether or not one should speak of such men as Stoics and Christians, is a matter of definitions.

If one cannot agree with all the positions taken by our author in the accessories to his central theme, it is a pleasure to be able to speak in unqualified praise of his account of Stoicism itself. The matter is everywhere well arranged and digested, and his summary of the Stoic doctrines is the best available in any single volume. For most readers it will be entirely adequate, though some will no doubt be disappointed by the brief exposition of the Stoic psychology and logic. For such Professor Arnold is prepared, because he clearly shares the distaste of his Roman authorities for the subtleties of logic; and, writing primarily of the Stoicism of the Empire, he has a clear right to adopt the perspective of the time. In the same way he may be excused for bestowing relatively little attention on the representatives of the period of transition,—on Panaetius and Posidonius,—in whose opinions students of Stoicism are at present generally most engrossed.

What one may perhaps most justly deplore is that our author, who admits the scant originality of thought and the failure of Stoicism to reduce to a thoroughly consistent system the body of opinions appropriated from predecessors and contemporaries, should not more clearly have pointed out the organizing principle of selection, although he possessed the key in the perception that Stoicism was essentially a temper of soul. This is the force operating toward unity in every system, and it is peculiarly interesting to follow its application in a system like that of the Stoics, who acknowledged no static unity, but found the principle of organization in the *τόνος* which works in all things.

Since this central doctrine of Stoicism is even now imperfectly understood it may be desirable to devote a little space to the consideration of its origin and applications, particularly as it well illustrates the curious development of concepts. Stein (*Die Psychologie der Stoa*, II., 129) and Baeumcker (*Das Problem der Materie*, 351, n. 3) have traced the Stoic doctrine of the *τόνος* to Hippocrates; most writers appear to have paid little attention to the question. Singular as it may seem, no one so far as I am aware has sought its origin, where one would most naturally expect to discover it, in the physics of Heraclitus. There was a brief reference to the problem in my article, *Qualitative Change*

in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Archiv für Gesch. der Philos., XIX.), 354, n. 55.

In Heraclitus occurs the conception of the *ἐναντιοδρομία* by which the cosmic fire or *ἀναθυμίασις* not only periodically constitutes and destroys the world but also maintains an unstable equilibrium in individual things. This equilibrium is variously called *παλίντροπος* and *παλίντονος ἁρμονίη*. In fr. 51, Diels gives the preference to the form *παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης*, because of Parmenides, fr. 6, 9 *πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλυσος*, although he admits that the variant *παλίντονος* is equally well attested and finds support in the phrase *παλίντονον τόξον* current from Homer onwards. But there is also a passage in Plato's Republic 439 B which, though commonly disregarded, seems to support the reading *παλίντονος*: *ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνται τε καὶ προσέλκονται*, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἢ ἀπωθοῦσα χεῖρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἢ προσαγομένη. Hippocrates, *Περὶ διαίτης*, I, 6 clearly shows that the thought was derived from Heraclitus. Although one might have been inclined to suspect the influence of Stoic tradition in the form *παλίντονος*, the suspicion is shown to be unfounded; and we have reason to approve the course of Bywater, who recognizes two fragments (XLV. and LVI.) instead of one.

According to Heraclitus, then, an object as empirically known is constituted by streams of fire (*ἀναθυμίασις* or, as Hippocrates and the Stoics commonly call it, *πνεῦμα*), regarded as entering and issuing from it. The object is of course in perpetual flux, and strictly speaking it could not be said, either from the Heraclitic or from the Stoic point of view, to exist, but only to be becoming; but practically things were conceived as constituted by the affluent stream and as dissipated by the effluents. It is the latter that strike the senses and determine the qualities which we ascribe to things. If we think of this conception as brought into relation to the Peripatetic distinction between essential (permanent) and accidental (variable) properties, we obtain the Stoic doctrine of the *τόνος* as we find it stated by Nemesius, *De nat. hom.*, 29 Ellebod. οἱ Στωϊκοὶ (λέγονσι) *τονικὴν* *τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων ἀποτελεστικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἐνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας*. The 'tension' varies according to the intensity of this refluent motion, the motion being much more rapid at the periphery of things (as in the cosmic fire and air) where the fire is kindling, and becoming sluggish at the center (as in water and earth) where it suffers extinction; cf. Censorinus, *De die natali*, I, 1, p. 75 Jahn: *tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium*. But just as Heraclitus applied conceptions which had a clear application only to physical things equally to mental concepts and moral ideals, so also did the Stoics embrace all things within the scope of their *κίνησις τονική*.

As applied to the soul, it was conceived as the *intentio animi*, the foundation of all the virtues, as the vices are forms of remissio, or the extinction of the divine fire in the soul. Here we find the highest expression of the tense temper of the Stoic, who might have said, in the words recorded in John 5, 17, *ὁ πατήρ μου ζῶς ἀπὶ ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγώ ἐργάζομαι*. The influence of the Stoic temper on the theories of rhetoric and style still calls for investigation. In this respect the treatise *Περὶ ὕψους*, with its emphasis on *ὑψος* and *πάθος* and its cosmopolitanism, presents a most attractive point of departure, although it also raises many questions not easy to answer.

But this review has already grown too long. In closing it should be said that the book is well printed and contains few typographical errors, except in the bibliography, which is not worthy of its place in the volume.

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BELZNER, E., *Homerische Probleme*. I. Die kulturellen Verhältnisse der Odyssee als kritische Instanz. Mit einem Nachwort (Aristarchea) von A. Roemer. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1911, VI, 202 pp. M. 5.

Dr. Belzner sets for himself the task of investigating the culture-stages of the Odyssey and from these stages to form an argument for its origin. According to the author the poet or poets of the Odyssey had the gift of abstraction, so there is often a distinct difference between the customs described and those of the age of the poet. When the poet speaks in his own person or uses similes he frequently refers to stages of culture different from those current in the Epic Age, or the assumed period of the Trojan War. There are thus two cultural groups, the one of the poet's age, the Homeric culture, the one of the age described, the epic culture, e. g., the poet refers to the boiling of meat, but warriors never eat boiled meat, the trumpet is mentioned in a simile, but is not used in the action of the poems, and there is a similar difference in matters of geography, cosmic beliefs, varieties of food, riding of horses, and the use of crowns or garlands.

The fact that the poems move between the conditions of the Homeric Age and the assumed Epic Age makes it impossible to divide the different parts of the poem on the basis of culture-stages.

The Odyssey is subjected to a careful test in regard to the following: Kings and Nobles, Material of Arms, Method of Arming, Riding of Horses, Dwellings, Dress, Food, Dowry, Burial, Writing, Temples, Images, and Religion. Each one of these divisions is treated with such thoroughness that a summary